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From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define
Speech on Matters of Public Concernt
STEPHEN ALLRED*

INTRODUCTION

In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Connick v. Myers, that the first
amendment's protection for public employees is not all-encompassing, but
extends only to speech on matters of public concern. 2 In Connick, the Court
determined by a 5-to-4 vote that a questionnaire circulated by ah assistant
district attorney which sought co-workers' views on office morale, the need
for a grievance committee, and management pressure to work on political
campaigns constituted speech on a matter of purely personal interest, and
thus did not involve a matter of public concern.3 Four years later, the Court
held in Rankin v. McPherson4 by another 5-to-4 vote that the statement of
a deputy constable, upon hearing of the 1981 attempt on President Reagan's
life, "if they go for him again, I hope they get him," 5 did constitute speech
6
on a matter of public concern.
One who seeks to reconcile Connick and Rankin can do so by close
examination, 7 but no "bright line" emerges from them to guide the public
f
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1. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
2. Id. at 147.
3. Id. at 148.
4. 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987).
5. Id. at 2895.
6. Id. at 2897.
7. In Connick, the Court examined the employee's speech in context and determined that,
except for the one question concerning political pressure, the questionnaire essentially amounted
to a personal grievance. Applying the balancing test between the interest of the employee in
free speech on a matter of public concern and the employer's interest in efficient government
set forth in Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (discussed infra text
accompanying notes 10-42) to the speech on political pressure, the Court found sufficient
evidence of potential disruption in the workplace to warrant dismissal of the employee. Connick,
461 U.S. at 142. In Rankin, the Court likewise examined the speech in context and found that
the offensive remark "was made in the course of a conversation addressing the policies of the
President's administration." 107 S. Ct. at 2897. Since the overall conversation was on a matter
of public concern (President Reagan's domestic policies), the speech satisfied the first prong of
*
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employer or employee in determining what constitutes speech on a matter
of public concern. Given the "enormous variety of fact situations in which
critical statements by . . . public employees"' may arise, that result is not
surprising. However, were one to go further and examine the decisions
rendered by the lower federal courts during the four years between Connick
and Rankin, one could not predict with certainty whether a given statement
by a public employee constitutes speech on a matter of public concern.
Instead, one would discover that while certain broad categories of speech
may be identified, conflict and confusion exist within those categories. The
conflict and confusion are attributable, in part, to the formulation for
determining whether speech is protected under Connick, as set forth below.9
This article examines the decisions of the courts since Connick to identify

certain categories of cases which have emerged and discusses the variables
which influence, but do not absolutely predict, the determination of whether
a public employee's statement will be held to constitute speech on a matter

of public concern. Following this discussion, the article considers some
alternatives to the Connick standard and recommends ways of reducing the

conflict and confusion.
I.

RECOGNITION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FREE SPEECH RIGHTS

A.

Pickering and its Progeny

It was not until 1968, in Pickering v. Board of Education,0 that the
Supreme Court squarely recognized the free speech right of public employees.

the Connick test. Applying the Pickering balance to the speech, the Court found no evidence
that the employee's statements had interfered with the government's interest in efficient functioning of the office or had otherwise discredited the office, since the speech was made in
private by a low-level clerk to her co-worker/boyfriend. Id. at 2899. Thus, Connick and Rankin
are not contradictory decisions, but merely reach different results applying the same rule of
law.
8. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.

9. See infra text accompanying notes 43-212.
10. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Pickering evolved from a series of cases involving the freedom of
association under the first amendment. Many states in the 1950's and 1960's had requirements
that public school teachers take loyalty oaths. These oaths were challenged as unconstitutional,
beginning with Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). In Weiman, a loyalty oath that
excluded from public employment persons who had innocent, as opposed to knowing, association
with certain subversive associations was held to constitute "an assertion of arbitrary power"
by the state. Id. at 191. In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), a school teacher refused
to sign an affidavit listing organizations to which he belonged. The Shelton Court held that a
state's indiscriminate requirement that membership be disclosed in any and all organizations
was an abuse of due process. Id. at 490. In Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278
(1961), the Court invalidated a requirement that school teachers sign a statement that they had
never aided or supported the communist party as too vague to constitutionally warrant termination for refusal to sign. Finally, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967),
faculty members of the State University of New York successfully argued that the New York
statute requiring them to sign a loyalty oath was an unconstitutional infringement on their first
amendment right of association.
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In Pickering, a public school teacher was dismissed for writing a letter to
the local newspaper criticizing the school board and the superintendent of
schools for funding athletic programs at the expense of academic excellence."
The Court held that the termination of the school teacher was an impermissible infringement on his protected speech, rejecting the notion "that
teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment
rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of
public interest .... ,,'2 Instead, the Court framed the proper inquiry as
"arriv[ing] at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State,
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs

through its employees.')

3

The balancing test established in Pickering was, by necessity, stated in
general terms. The Court noted the impossibility of anticipating the variety
of circumstances in which a public employee's speech might be balanced
against the employer's exercise of managerial efficiency, and held instead
that in these types of cases three factors are to be considered in striking the
balance.' 4 These factors, discussed in turn below, are (1) the parties' working
relationship, (2) the detrimental effect of the speech on the employer, and
(3) the nature of the issue upon which the employee spoke and the relationship
of the employee to that issue. 5
The Pickering Court, in evaluating the first factor, the parties' working
relationship, noted that the school teacher's letter to the newspaper criticized
the policies of the school board-not his direct supervisors with whom he

11. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566.
12. Id. at 568. Note that the first amendment right recognized by Pickering is the citizen's
right to comment on matters of public interest. Private speech-that is, speech which does not
implicate the relationship of the government to the citizen-does not rise to the level of protected
speech recognized by Pickering. The subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court proceed from
this premise. Thus, there are three categories of speech: first, protected speech, implicating
important first amendment interests; second, routine speech, which, although perfectly permissible, constitutes no more than common conversations among persons on subjects of private
interest having no first amendment implications (see, e.g., Yoggerst v. Hedges, 739 F.2d 293
(7th Cir. 1984) (public employee's comment to a co-worker concerning rumor that agency
director had been fired, "Did you hear the good news?" not protected speech)); and third,
outlawed speech, such as obscenity (see, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973)) or recklessly false statements (see, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964)).
13. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. Note that while the Pickering balancing test applied only to
speech on matters of public concern and not to speech of purely private interest, the Court
provided no further guidance on distinguishing the two.
14. Id. at 569. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, indicated that "some of the general
lines along which an analysis of the controlling interests should run" in evaluating public
employee free speech cases, but left open the possibility that factors other than those in Pickering
might be controlling, given the "enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements
by teachers and other public employees may be thought by their superiors, against whom the
statements are directed, to furnish grounds for dismissal ....
" Id.
15. Id. at 570-72.
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had to maintain a close working relationship. 6 The distant nature of the
working relationship thus tipped the scales in favor of the employee in this
case, as there was no threat to the immediate supervisor's ability to maintain
necessary discipline at the work site, nor a demonstration of any disharmony
among co-workers resulting from publication of the letter.
The Court evaluated the second factor, the detrimental effect of the speech
on the employer, and concluded that the speech did not warrant dismissal
of the employee. The employer asserted that any publicly made false statement by the employee was per se harmful to the employer.' 7 The Court
rejected this per se rule and concluded that the nature and content of the
speech must be examined in order to make a case-by-case determination of
the detrimental impact of the speech on the public service.18 In this case,
the statement amounted to nothing more than a difference of opinion over
allocation of school board funds, and the mere act of airing an opinion in
the newspaper did not have sufficient effect on the school board's ability to
make that allocation to warrant termination of the employee.
The third factor, the nature of the issue and the employee's relationship
to that issue, was also resolved in favor of the employee in Pickering. The
matter of public concern at issue before the Court was the allocation of
funds, which was to be resolved through referendum by the voting public.
As a school teacher, Pickering and his co-workers were "the members of
the community most likely to have informed and definite opinions" on the
matter. 9 Where there is a close nexus between the employee and the issue,
the possibility that the employee will make a valuable contribution to public
understanding tips the scales in favor of protecting the employee's speech. 20
Three cases decided after Pickering provided clarification of the balancing
test. First, in Perry v. Sindermann,2' further elaboration of the third factor
noted above, the relationship of the employee to the issue, was provided by
the Court. Sindermann, a college professor, was denied renewal of his
employment contract with Odessa Junior College after he testified before

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 570.
Id. at 571.
Id.
Id. at 572.

20. Id. at 572-74. The relationship of the employee to the issue is a factor which cuts both
ways. In Pickering, the fact that the school teacher had a personal stake in the outcome of the
referendum was used to support his free speech claim. As a teacher, he was uniquely qualified
to speak on the effect that a failure to pass the bond issue would have on the quality of
education in the school district. In some later cases, however, the fact that the employee stood
to gain from the position he advocated was used to characterize the speech as a "personal
grievance" and not a matter of public concern. Indeed, it is precisely this result of Connick
that narrowed the free speech right of public employees. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Their relationship
to the issue is now considered first in determining whether the speech is protected, and then
again in determining how to strike the balance between the employee's first amendment rights
and the employer's interest in efficient government. Id.
21. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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the Texas legislature in favor of a proposal to elevate all junior colleges to
four-year institutions. The proposal was opposed by the Board of Regents
of Odessa. In evaluating his free speech claim, the Court noted that Sindermann was both a teacher in the system to be changed and a spokesman for
the local teacher's association. As such, he was a member of the public
who, by virtue of his position, was likely to have special insight on the
matter of public concern.22 Second, in Mount Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle,n the Court set forth the burden of proof an
employer must meet in dismissing an employee for exercising free speech
rights. In Mount Healthy, a school teacher was dismissed both for his
reporting to a local radio station on the establishment of a teacher dress
code and for unprofessional conduct in dealing with staff and students. The
Court held that the burden is initially on the employee to show that he was
engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, and that this conduct was a
motivating factor in the decision to dismiss. Once this prima facie showing
is made, the burden then shifts to the employer to show that the termination
would have occurred irrespective of the protected activity. 24 Third, in Givhan
v. Western Line Consolidated School District,5 the Court held that the
Pickering test applied to free speech even in a private setting. In Givhan, a
school teacher expressed her opposition to certain school board policies as
racially discriminatory in one-on-one meetings with her supervisor. She
claimed her subsequent termination was in retaliation for expressing her
concerns.? The Court held that Pickering applied to private discussions
between employer and employee, and that in determining the proper balance
between free speech and the efficiency of the service, the time, place, and
manner of the speech could be considered.2 7
In sum, Pickering established a test that was both a broad framework for
balancing the free speech rights of public employees against the public
interest in an efficient public service, and, within that framework, a more
specific listing of the factors to be considered in striking the ultimate balance.
Although the Pickering test was clarified by later rulings, the approach to
evaluating free speech claims of public employees remained essentially the
same until the Connick decision.
B.

The Connick Decision and the Narrowing of Pickering

Until the decision in Connick v. Myers, the Court had never required a
separate examination of the speech involved to determine whether the Pick-

22. Id. at 594-95.

23.
24.
25.
26.

429 U.S. 274 (1977).
Id. at 287.
439 U.S. 410 (1979).
Id. at 412-13.

27. Id. at 415 n.4.
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ering balancing test was to be applied. In Connick, however, Justice White,
writing for the majority, stated that the district court "got off on the wrong
foot in this case ' 28 by incorrectly characterizing the questionnaire circulated
by Myers as a matter of public concern. The lower court had ruled that
because the questionnaire addressed the effective functioning of a public
agency, the issues addressed were matters of public concern. 29 Defendant
Connick argued, in contrast, that because the questionnaire was concerned
only with internal office matters, it was not in any manner speech on a
matter of public concern.30 Justice White rejected both views and instead
constructed a continuum along which speech by a public employee could
fall-from speech which has so little value that the state could prohibit it
to speech of vital interest to the public." The Court held that for a public
employee's speech to be protected, it could not simply be characterized as
falling generally within the realm of matters of public concern; instead, a
threshold determination must be made by examining "the content, form and
context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." '32 Thus, a
two-pronged test was framed: Does the speech involve a matter of public
concern? If so, does the employee's first amendment interest outweigh the
employer's interest in an efficient public service? Finally, if the answer to
both prongs of the Connick test was "yes," Mount Healthy required a
showing by the employee that his speech was a substantial or motivating
factor in the decision to discipline him, which the employer could rebut only
by proving that the discipline would have been imposed irrespective of the
protected conduct of the employee.33 It was against this standard that the
questionnaire was evaluated.
The questionnaire consisted of fourteen entries.3 4 Only one entry, the
question concerning pressure to work for office-supported candidates, touched
on a matter of public concern, according to the Court. 35 Because that question

28. 461 U.S. at 143.
29. Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 758 (E.D. La. 1981) (the court held that a review
of the contents of the questionnaire showed that the issues addressed by the questions were,
considered as a whole, matters of public concern), aff'd, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd,
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
30. Connick, 461 U.S. at 143.
31. Id. at 147. Justice White gave as an example of the former, obscenity, and as an
example of the latter, Pickering's criticism concerning allocation of school funds.
32. Id. at 147-48.
33. Id. at 147-54.
34. Id. at 155-56. Questions 1 through 5 asked employees to describe their experience with
office transfers. Questions 6 through 9 asked employees about the existence of a rumor mill
and its effect on morale. Question 10 asked for an assessment of the supervisory staff. Question
11 asked whether employees were pressured to work on political campaigns on behalf of
candidates supported by the District Attorney. Questions 12 through 14 asked whether a grievance
committee was needed, whether morale in the office was good, and whether any other issue of
concern to the employees needed to be addressed.
35. Id. at 149.
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was "a matter of interest to the community upon which it is essential that
public employees be able to speak out freely," ' 6 application of the Pickering
balancing test was warranted. The majority then considered the state's right
to maintain an efficient office by removing a disruptive employee against
in political campaigns
the employee's right to redress unwilling participation
37
and resolved the balance in favor of the state.
Justice Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion in Connick, disagreeing with
Justice White's characterization of the bulk of the questionnaire as a grievance and, more importantly, criticizing the majority's approach to first
amendment analysis. In Brennan's view, the Court's approach was flawed
because a matter of public concern was now to be defined by examining the
content, form, and context of the statement; further, the context in which
the statement was made was now to be considered twice: first in determining
the threshold issue of whether the speech is a matter of public concern, and
second in determining whether there was undue disruption under the Pickering balancing test.38 Classifying a statement as a matter of public concern
simply does not, according to Justice Brennan, depend on where or why it
was said.39 By limiting the subjects which may be characterized as matters
of public concern, stated the dissent, the majority had impermissibly narrowed the issues upon which a public employee could speak without fear of
dismissal. 40
In Connick, the Court made it more difficult for an employee to invoke
the Pickering/Mount Healthy standard by holding that a threshold inquiry
must be made to classify the speech as a matter of public concern. Further,
the Court made the Pickering balancing test more difficult to resolve in the
employee's favor by ruling that the mere apprehension by a supervisor that
disruption of the work place might occur is a sufficient reason to tip the
balance in favor of the state, even though the employee spoke on a matter
of public concern.
The Connick majority was particularly concerned that employees might
contest routine personnel decisions as free speech infringements, stating that
"government offices could not function if every employment decision became
a constitutional matter.' 14 Rather, stated Justice White, "government offi-

36. Id.
37. Id. at 153-54.
38. Id. at 157-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan agreed with the
"how and where a public employee expresses his views are relevant" in applying
test, but only in considering the detrimental impact on the employer. Here the
giving double weight to the context in which the statement was made, resulting
narrow definition of matters of public concern. Id. at 158.
39. Id. at 160.
40. Id. at 158.
41. Connick, 461 U.S. at 143.

majority that
the Pickering
majority was
in an unduly
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cials should enjoy wide lattitude in managing their offices, without42intrusive
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.
The article now examines the aftermath of Connick, as measured by the
subsequent decisions of the lower federal courts, to determine the effects of
the Connick standard on speech that is a matter of public concern.

II.

APPLICATION OF CONNICK

BY THE LOWER COURTS

In the five years since the Court's decision in Connick v. Myers, there
have been over 300 applications of the Connick standard by the federal
courts to determine whether a statement by a public employee constituted
speech on a matter of public concern and, if so, whose interests should
prevail. Certain broad categories of cases may be identified from a review
of these decisions, from which some guidelines emerge for determining
whether a given statement is speech on a matter of public concern.

A.

Speech on Matters of Current Community Debate

At one end of the spectrum devised by Justice White in Connick lies a
category of cases in which the speech clearly constitutes a matter of public
concern; these cases involve speech on an issue of current community
debate. 43 In these cases the speech by the public employee is made either in
a public forum held to solicit the views of interested parties or through a
letter to a local newspaper or administrative body. Irrespective of the forum,
the employee takes a position contrary to that taken by his employer. The
employee is disciplined (sometimes dismissed) and claims the discipline was
in violation of his first amendment right to speak on a matter of public
concern.
It is noteworthy that in many of these cases the employee has no direct
interest in the outcome of the matter because his employment is not threatened by the ultimate resolution of the issue. Thus, unlike the plaintiff in

42. Id. at 146. The Court further noted that "a federal court is not the appropriate forum
in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in
reaction to the employee's behavior." Id. at 147. The ramifications of broadly defining a matter
of public concern include the presumption "that all matters which transpire within a government
office are of public concern . . . [and] that virtually every remark-and certainly every criticism
directed at a public official-would plant the seed of a constitutional case." Id. at 149.
43. Speech on issues of current community debate has long been recognized as serving one
of the central purposes of the first amendment: to protect the dissemination of information on
the basis of which members of society may make reasoned decisions about the government.
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218-19 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964). In the context
of public employees' comments on the actions of their employer, the government, the admonition
that free speech includes "the manner in which government is operated or should be operated"
is noteworthy. Mills, 384 U.S. at 218.
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Connick whose expression was clearly motivated, at least in part, by concern
about her own job security, the plaintiffs in many of these cases speak "as
members of the community most likely to have informed and definite
opinions."" It is also significant that in all of these cases the issue about
which the employee speaks is a matter that has received recent attention in
the community at large through the newspaper or some other public vehicle.
A brief review of a representative sampling of these cases follows.
In Whalen v. Roanoke County -Boardof Supervisors,4 plaintiff Richard
Whalen, an engineer employed by Roanoke County, Virginia, spoke in
March of 1976 before the State Corporation Commission. Whalen voiced
his opposition to a power company's proposal to erect power lines through
Floyd County, where he lived. When asked, Whalen identified himself as a
Roanoke County employee, but did not purport to speak as a representative
of the county. The morning after his appearance before the commission,
Whalen was fired by his supervisor. That termination was immediately
rescinded at the advice of the county attorney, and Whalen continued his
employment with the county for another three years. In 1979, Whalen was
fired again, allegedly for engaging in a real estate transaction involving
county property from which Whalen benefited personally. Whalen claimed
his termination was in retaliation for his testimony, three years earlier, before
the commission. 46
Judge Butzner, writing for a divided court, held that the testimony given
by Whalen before the commission was speech on a matter of public concern
under the first prong of the Connick analysis.47 Further, held the court,
under the second prong of Connick, Whalen's right to comment on a matter
of public concern outweighed the county's interest in promoting the efficiency
of the public service, particularly where Roanoke County had no interest in
the location of a power line in Floyd County.4 The court noted the county
does have an interest in ensuring that employees do not represent it without
authority, but that where, as here, the employee spoke for himself and not
49
as a representative of Roanoke County, no such interest was impaired.
Applying the Mount Healthy standard, the court upheld the finding by the
jury that Whalen was fired for his protected conduct, and that Roanoke
County would not have dismissed him absent that conduct.

44. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968).
45. 769 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
46. Id. at 222-24. The dissent noted the extended time that lapsed between Whalen's
testimony and his termination, and argued that "there was no more than a mere remote
possibility that Whalen's 1979 discharge resulted from Whalen's 1976 speech." Id. at 229 (Ervin,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47. Id.at 225.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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Similarly, in Micilcavage v. Connelie,50 plaintiff Joseph Micilcavage, a
New York state police officer, was disciplined for violating a department
rule prohibiting public speeches by employees who lacked prior authorization
from the superintendent. Micilcavage spoke on drug and alcohol abuse before
a local PTA, was issued a letter of censure, and was placed on six-months
probation for failing to obtain clearance as required by the New York State
Police Administrative Manual. 5' Micilcavage claimed that the disciplinary
action violated his free speech rights, and that the regulation was vague and
overbroad.
The court held that the speech in this case clearly constituted a matter of
public concern under Connick, stating that it "concerned a subject that is
at the forefront of the public interest. '52 Proceeding to the second prong of
the Connick test, the court held that the police department's regulation
requiring authorization before an officer makes a public presentation was
"reasonably related to the promotion of employee discipline and protection
of the reputation of the New York State Police. ' 53 Nonetheless, the court
ultimately resolved the matter in favor of Micilcavage, holding that the
regulation was vague, overbroad, and a prior restraint on the exercise of his
54
first amendment rights.
The Whalen and Micilcavage cases illustrate application of the Connick
test to employee speech in a public forum on a matter of current community
debate. The article considers below three cases involving written expression
by public employees on matters of current community debate, Zook v.
Brown,55 Anderson v. Central Point School District No. 6,56 and McGee v.
South Pemiscot School District R-V. 57 In these cases, the plaintiffs' speech
occurred not in a public meeting, but rather through writing letters to a
newspaper or to an administrative body.
In Zook v. Brown, plaintiff Stephen Zook, a Champaign County, Illinois,
deputy sheriff, wrote a letter to the newspaper stating that in his ten years
as deputy sheriff he had had the opportunity to observe the work of the
current county emergency medical service provider-Arrow Ambulance Service-and that he was impressed with their dedication and professionalism. s
Zook wrote the letter at the time the county was considering whether to

50. 570 F. Supp. 975 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
51. Id. at 976-77.
52. Id. at 978. The court distinguished the situation in Connick as concerning "a disgruntled
employee [who] circulated a petition that largely challenged her employer's administration of
the office." By contrast, "[t]here can be little doubt that the public has a legitimate interest in
controlling drug and alcohol abuse by the members of society." Id.
53. Id. at 981.
54. Id. at 981-82.
55. 748 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1984).
56. 746 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1984).
57. 712 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1983).
58. 748 F.2d at 1163.
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continue using the current provider or to replace them with another contractor. As in Micilcavage, there existed a department manual prohibiting
the expression of public statements or appearances by employees without
obtaining prior approval. The manual also prohibited an officer from using
his name, photograph, or title in connection with any testimonial or advertisement without obtaining prior approval.59 Zook's supervisor read the letter
in the newspaper and gave Zook a written reprimand, stating that Zook's
letter placed the sheriff's department in an "uncomfortable position" and
that department employees were to maintain strict neutrality on this issue to
avoid the appearance of collusion between law enforcement and emergency
service personnel.60
Zook challenged the reprimand as violative of his free speech rights. The
district court upheld the disciplinary action, finding the sheriff's action
justified under the manual's provisions and recognizing the department's
interest in limiting the employees' right to contribute to public debate on
the'issue. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case for a determination of whether the manual's provisions were unconstitutional as applied
to Zook.6'
Under Connick, held the court, several factors must be considered to
determine whether Zook's expression constituted discussion on a matter of
public concern and, if so, whether the balance of interests should be struck
in his favor. 62 First, in applying the Connick threshold requirement that the
speech be on a matter of public concern, the court noted that it was
"important in the context of this case to define the actual scope of the
public debate in which Zook claims to have participated. ' 63 The court
determined that Arrow was the subject of debate in Champaign County.
Thus, Zook's letter commending Arrow was speech on a matter of public
concern because to comment on Arrow was to comment on the provision
of emergency services in the county. Second, the court held that the scope
of the debate must be considered in evaluating the balance between Zook's
first amendment interest and the county's interest in limiting his expression.
If the current service provider was one of many possible contractors, reasoned

59. Id. The manual stated, under the heading "Abuse of Position," the following: "Use of
Name, Photograph, or Title: Officers shall not authorize the use of their names, photographs'
or official titles which identify them as officers in connection with testimonials or advertisements
of any commodity or commercial enterprise, without the written approval of the sheriff." Under
the heading of "Public Statements and Appearances" the manual provided: "When acting as
representatives of the department, officers shall receive approval from the sheriff before they
address public gatherings, appear on radio or television, prepare any articles for publication,
act as correspondents to a newspaper or periodical release, or divulge investigative information
or any other matters of the department." Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.at 1166-67.
63. Id.at 1166.
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the court, then Zook's comments favoring the current contractor could be
seen as impairing the county's professed policy of neutrality. If, however,
the current provider was the only one in the county, then the county's
interest in limiting debate would be entitled to less weight because no other
contractor's opportunities for selection were lessened by Zook's comments.6
Finally, the court held that the time, place, and manner of Zook's expression
must be considered, with the key issue being whether Zook was acting as a
department representative or "merely expressing his own opinions as a private
'
citizen." 65
The case was remanded to the district court.
In Anderson, a teacher/coach was suspended from coaching for sending
a letter to school board members describing his proposal to restructure the
athletic program. 6 Plaintiff Anderson sent his letter as a follow-up to remarks
he made at an open meeting held by the board to discuss school athletics.
The court, applying Connick, held that Anderson's letter involved a matter
of public concern. 67 The court rejected the school district's argument that
because Anderson's letter contained details of his proposed restructuring
which were not of general public interest, the letter fell outside the ambit
of protected speech. The court stated:
It cannot be disputed, however, that the subject of the letter was the
athletic program itself, the very subject discussed at the public meeting
called by the Board and which the defendants agree was of public concern.
The letter should not lose its status as a communication protected by the
first amendment merely because it contains some details. Connick does
not require every word of a communication to be of interest to the
public. 8
The court also upheld the lower court's application of the Pickering balancing
69
test in favor of the employee.
Similarly, in McGee, the plaintiff, also a teacher/coach, wrote a letter to
70
the local newspaper in support of continuing the junior high track program.
McGee's letter was prompted by a previous letter signed by three school
board members explaining their decision to end the program and claiming
that McGee had recommended cutting the program. McGee's letter disputed
that claim. Following publication of McGee's letter, he was denied renewal
of his employment contract. McGee alleged the board's failure to renew his
contract was in retaliation for exercising his free speech rights. 7'

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 1166-67.
Id. at 1167.
746 F.2d at 505.
Id. at 507.
Id.
Id. at 506-07.
712 F.2d at 339.
Id. at 340.
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The court held that the question of whether to continue the track program
at the junior high school had become a matter of public concern.7 2 The
court noted that members of the community had circulated petitions urging
the school board to reconsider its decision to end the program, that the
matter had become a campaign issue during the recent school board election,
and that the school board had chosen to defend their decision in a public
forum by writing a letter to the newspaper.7 3 Applying the balancing test,
the court held there was sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that
McGee's letter had no adverse impact on the school system, and that his
first amendment interests outweighed the employer's interest in preventing
disruption. 74 The court remanded the case to consider McGee's requests for
equitable relief.
In all of these cases, then, the court held that the subject in question was
a matter of public concern because it was a matter of current community
debate and interest. This result is not surprising and is clearly the type of
speech both the Pickering and Connick courts envisioned as involving matters
of public concern. It is also significant that in all but one of these cases the
public employee was not in a situation in which resolution of the debate
might have an adverse impact on the employee's position. 75 But as we move
from this relatively well-defined end of the spectrum, conflicting decisions
begin to appear.
B.

Speech Alleging Malfeasance or Abuse of Office

Closely related to the first category of cases is a second group of decisions
in which the speech by the employee concerns possible malfeasance or abuse
of public office.
In Gonzalez v. Benavides7 6 plaintiff Edgardo Gonzalez, executive director
of a federally funded anti-poverty program, questioned whether the local
board of county commissioners and the "commissioners' court had complied
with federal regulations in reinstating an employee whom Gonzalez had
terminated. Gonzalez also disputed the commissioners' view that he was
subject to evaluations of his performance by the commissioners and refused
publicly to acknowledge their authority in conducting these evaluations.
Following these incidents, Gonzalez was dismissed; he filed suit claiming his

72. Id. at 342.

73. Id.
74. Id.

75. In McGee, 712 F.2d at 340-41, the teacher was also the track coach. Thus, if the school
board terminated the junior high track program, he would forfeit his responsibilities, and the
extra pay, that came with the program.
76. 774 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1140 (1986).
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dismissal was in retaliation for questioning the propriety of the board's
actions.

77

The court, in an in-depth analysis of the Connick two-pronged test, first
held that Gonzalez's speech invoived a matter of public concern. 78 The court
reasoned that in raising the possibility that the board's actions in reinstating
the terminated employee were in violation of federal regulations, Gonzalez
was speaking on a matter which, if true, could result in thousands of county
residents losing millions of dollars in federal assistance. Noted the court,
"While such a catastrophe may have been unlikely, we believe the importance
of the programs at stake raised the issue to a matter of significant public
concern." 79 The court further, held that the question of whether the commissioners' court complied with federal regulations was a matter of public
concern.80 Finally, the court held that the question of allocating authority
and the
and responsibilities among the board, the commissioners' court,
8
office of the executive director was a matter of public concern. 1
Turning to the second prong of the Connick test, the court considered the
governmental interest at stake. First, the court evaluated the nature of the
working relationship of the parties and concluded that no close working
relationship between Gonzalez and the board or the commissioners' court
was required. However, the court sustained the lower court's finding that,
irrespective of the absence of a close working relationship, Gonzalez occupied
a particularly sensitive policymaking position in which he could frustrate the
policies of the commissioners. 2 Second, the court examined the government's
interest in requiring the loyalty of a key executive employee. The court found
that the employer had made no showing that Gonzalez's speech was likely
to undermine the commissioners' policies, or that his failure publicly to
acknowledge the authority of the commissioners posed a threat to the
agency's operation.83 Gonzalez had not challenged the authority of the
commissioners' court, held the court, but had only protested that, in exercising its authority, the commissioners' court had violated agency regulations.
The court considered the balance between Gonzalez's free speech rights
and the governmental interest in maintaining a loyal, non-disruptive working
relationship and struck that balance in favor of the employee.8 In so doing,
the court noted the difficulty of balancing first amendment rights on a caseby-case basis, stating: "In many cases judges are free to decide the case on
a hunch. Because of this unpredictability, individualized balancing inevitably

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1297-98.
1300-01.
1301.
1301-02.
1302.
1303.
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chills some protected speech even as it discourages government officials from
'
acting vigorously against some unprotected speech." '85
Another case involving alleged violations of federal regulations by local
government is Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium.-" Carol Patkus was
the administrator of the Sangamon-Cass Consortium, an agency responsible
for administering the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)
program. An employee filed a complaint over a personnel action taken by
Patkus, and the Consortium appointed a hearing officer, Bruce Stratton, to
investigate the complaint. Patkus sent a telegram to the Department of Labor
stating concerns about the political involvement of Stratton and issuing
specific charges against him, and called a meeting of selected members of
the Consortium's advisory council at which she referred to the investigation
as a "witch hunt." Patkus was dismissed a few days later, with the
Consortium citing numerous instances of "insubordinate conduct," including
the incidents noted above, as the basis for her dismissal. Patkus claimed she
87
was dismissed in retaliation for the exercise of her first amendment rights.
The district court held that Patkus's telegram to the Department of Labor
constituted speech on a matter of public concern under Connick, but that
her dismissal was for insubordination-conduct not protected by the first
amendment.8 8 The court of appeals agreed with the lower court that the
telegram was a matter of public concern.8 9 Turning to her speech before the
advisory council, however, the court stated that her comments "do not fit
so readily into the recognized areas of public concern." 9 Of critical importance to the court was the fact that her statements to the council were a
"mere extension" of her personal dispute with her superiors. 91 The court
considered the content, form, and context of Patkus's speech as follows:
The content of Patkus's statements consisted of accusations against the
absent members and those involved in the Stratton investigation and
admonitions that the Advisory Council should not question her actions

or communicate with county officials; the form of the statements included

85. Id. The court went on to note, however, that no feasible alternative to a case-by-case
approach existed "because public employees speak in a great variety of circumstances [and]
individualized balancing seems preferable to a predictable but inflexible categorical approach."
Id. See also McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 1983) (discussed infra
text accompanying note 137) ("We recognize the courts have had some difficulty deciding when
speech deals with an issue of 'public concern."').
86. 769 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1985).
87. Id. at 1254-56.
88. Id. at 1256.
89. Id. at 1257. The court stated: "A government employee has the right to make goodfaith accusations of malfeasance in office, even when the accusations are against fellow workers."
Id.
90. Id. at 1257.
91. Id. The court viewed speech which informed the council of important matters relating
to the program it oversees as a matter of public concern, but distinguished Patkus's statements
before the council as amounting to no more than a personal grievance. Id.
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terms such as "witch hunt;" and the context in which they were made
was a meeting that quite literally created division in a body functioning
within the county government. These statements to the Advisory Council
go well beyond Patkus's interest, as a citizen, in commenting on matters
of public concern.2

Since the telegram involved a matter of public concern, the court proceeded
to the second prong of the Connick test to balance Patkus's interest against

the county's. Because the telegram had been sent before local officials were
given an opportunity to respond to the charges Patkus made, and because

the telegram contained statements "likely to create division and controversy
among officials of the county for whom Patkus worked," 93 the court struck
the balance in favor of the county. 94 In so holding, the court stated that
Patkus "was engaging in highly disruptive, conflict-creating behavior, even
though she was speaking about an important matter of public concern.' ' 9
A similar result was reached in Johnson v. Town of Elizabethtown.9
Plaintiff Deborah Johnson, Town Clerk of Elizabethtown, North Carolina,
raised certain concerns about town management practices. Specifically, John-

son cited as improper the use of a facsimile signature stamp on town checks
by the town administrator, the payment of tax collection fees without first
obtaining written authorization by the town administrator, and the notarizing
of right-of-way easements not signed in her presence. Johnson also complained to the town administrator about her long hours and low salary. She
was dismissed and filed suit, claiming that her termination was in retaliation
for her criticism of improper town management. 97
The court held that only Johnson's comments about the facsimile stamp,
tax collection, and the notarization procedure constituted speech on matters
of public concern. 98 Even though her speech was protected, the court found
that Johnson's dismissal was not attributable to her protected conduct, but

rather to her hostility and incompatibility with her co-workers. 99

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 1257.
Id. at 1258.
Id.
Id. at 1259.

96. 800 F.2d 404 (4th Cir. 1986). The Fourth Circuit had previously applied the Connick
standard in Jones v. Dodson, 727 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir. 1984) (concerning the termination of
certain sheriff's department deputies and whether such termination was violative of their first
amendment right of political affiliation and their right of free speech, as exercised during the
political campaign); and Jurgensen v. Fairfax County, 745 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1984) (discussed
infra text accompanying note 101-03).
97. Johnson, 800 F.2d at 405-06.
98. Id. at 406.
99. Id. No showing was made that the town board, in its deliberations on whether to dismiss
Johnson, had considered her questioning of proper administrative procedures. Id. at 406-07.
The court cited Connick for the proposition that in some situations a supervisor need not
tolerate speech on matters of public concern if he reasonably believes the speech would cause
undue disruption and undermining of the worksite. Id. at 406. The court simply concluded that
this was such a case, without elaborating on the balancing test required by Connick.
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Although Johnson's speech was not found to be the basis for her dismissal,
the court's determination that the subject matter of her speech-mismanagement of a public agency-was protected, was consistent with previous
rulings of the Fourth Circuit and other courts.1°° Within the Fourth Circuit,
however, a narrow view of what constituted speech alleging mismanagement
had prevailed. The court had previously held in Jurgensen v. FairfaxCounty'0 1
that an internal report detailing administrative problems in a county emergency response office was not a matter of public concern.e 2 As in Johnson,
there was no showing in the Jurgensen case that the "but for" or "motivating" cause of the discipline proposed against the county employee who
supplied the report to the newspaper was the exercise of his free speech
right. Rather, the discipline was imposed for his insubordination.0 3 A year
later, in Daniels v. Quinn, 104
the Fourth Circuit appeared to limit protected
speech under Connick to those matters which "relate to wrongdoing or a
breach of trust, not ordinary matters of internal agency policy."' 1 5 Under

100. See, e.g., McMurphy v. City of Flushing, 802 F.2d 191, 198 (6th Cir. 1986) (accusations
of misconduct by city manager and police chief protected speech, but subsequent threats by
employee to superiors not protected); Marohnic v. Walker, 800 F.2d 613, 616 (6th Cir. 1986)
(public employee's speech consisting of cooperation with investigation into fraudulent medical
billing by his public employer touched on a matter of public concern and was entitled to first
amendment protection); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268 (7th Cir. 1986) (employee's disclosure
of violations of tax act by various government employees to press was speech on matter of
public concern), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 172 (1987); O'Brien v. Town of Caledonia, 748 F.2d
403, 407 (7th Cir. 1984) (informing public of potential graft and corruption protected speech);
Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 317 (7th Cir.) (allegations of corruption in FBI held protected
speech), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918 (1983); Rookard v. Health and Hospitals Corp., 710 F.2d
41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983) (exposing corruption and waste in government is "obviously" a matter
of public concern); Twist v. Meese, 661 F. Supp. 231, 233 (D.D.C. 1987) (allegation that U.S.
Department of Justice officials obstructed an investigation is speech on a matter of public
concern); Solomon v. Royal Oak Township, 656 F. Supp. 1254, 1262 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (report
of corruption in police department was protected speech, with balance of interests in employee's
favor); Pelrozza v. Incorporated Village of Freeport, 602 F. Supp. 137, 142-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(speech by city plumbing inspector alleging code violations by city contractors brought to light
breach of public trust and is protected). But see Berry v. Bailey, 726 F.2d 670, 675-76 (11th
Cir. 1984) (refusal by deputy to heed sheriff's directions to dismiss charges against arrestees
was insubordination, not protected speech alleging corruption), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1101
(1985); Howkins v. Caldwell, 587 F. Supp. 98, 107 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (insubordination not
protected speech), aff'd, 749 F.2d 731 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985).
101. 745 F.2d 868 (1984).
102. Id. at 888. Stated the court:
It seems pretty obvious that the report did not include material of any substantial
public concern. As we have said, it brought 'to light [no] actual or potential
wrongdoing or breach of trust;' it dealt more accurately with what would be
characterized as 'internal office policy' of an agency and with the 'pay, hour and
conditions of employment,' which. . . did not qualify of sufficient public concern
as to justify First Amendment protection.
Id. (citation omitted).
103. Id. at 888. Jurgensen is reexamined in depth in Part III of this article.
104. 801 F.2d 687 (4th Cir. 1986).
105. Id. at 690. "For example, personal grievances about working conditions do not qualify
as matters of public concern," stated the court. Id.
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the Daniels decision, then, only speech alleging malfeasance or abuse of
office was protected, and under Jurgensen, the scope of protected speech
within this narrow category was limited. But late in 1987, the Fourth Circuit
reexamined the scope of protected speech and backed off the narrow view
set forth in Daniels with the issuance of Piver v. Pender County Board of
Education.101
In Gonzalez, Patkus, Johnson, and Jurgensen the employee was involved
in a personal dispute with the public employer. Obviously, that fact was not
dispositive, as Edgardo Gonzalez was able to prevail in the application of
the second prong of the Connick test.'07 Yet, where the employee is not
involved in a personal dispute with the employer and brings to light allegations of malfeasance or abuse of office, the courts appear more likely to
rule that the speech in question is on a matter of public concern.108 The

article next examines some of those decisions.
In Czurlanis v. Albanese,'09 plaintiff John Czurlanis appeared before a
county governing board and made allegations of inefficiency, falsification of
reports, and the performance of unnecessary repairs in the county motor
vehicles department in which he worked. Four days after his appearance,

Czurlanis was transferred to a less desirable garage and suspended for ten
days for failure to use the grievance procedure to air his complaints. Czurlanis
spoke at the next board meeting against certain tax expenditures and received

a thirty-day suspension. Czurlanis claimed his first amendment rights were
abridged by the suspensions." 0
The court held that Czurlanis's speech was on a matter of public concern."'
Noting that "unlike the plaintiff in Connick, it appears that before Czurlanis

106. 835 F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1987).
107. See also Ohse v. Hughes, 816 F.2d 1144 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1070
(1988) (judgment vacated and remanded to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals). Plaintiff
Ohse, a probation officer, first told fellow employees that the chief probation oftrcer (with
whom Ohse had a poor working relationship) drank at work and falsified his mileage expenses,
and later sent a letter containing the same allegations to four judges, county board members,
and the state attorney general's office. Ohse was dismissed, but the court held that his speech
was on a matter of public concern (abuse of public office) and that the balance of interests
fell in his favor. The court noted that although Ohse and Hughes had a close working relationship
and that the letter had a disruptive impact on the office, the matter was of high public concern
and that Ohse, as a citizen, was entitled to raise it. Thus, despite Ohse's series of personal
disputes with his supervisor, he was able to prevail under the Connick analysis.
108. Tacit acknowledgement of the enhanced status of the employee who is not involved in
a personal dispute with the employer is arguably found in Judge Ervin's concurring opinion in
Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 891: "I cannot accept the clear implication that when the balancing
process is appropriate a finding that the employee has been guilty of 'insubordination' in any
form and under all circumstances automatically and irrevocably tips the scales in favor of the
employer." Id. (Ervin, J., concurring).
109. 721 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1983).
110. Id. at 98-101.
111. Id. at 103.
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addressed the public meeting .

.

. he was secure in his position,"112 the

court considered the content, form, and context of the speech. The content
of Czurianis's remarks fell "squarely within the core public speech delineated
in Connick""i-whether public officials were properly discharging their
governmental responsibilities. In holding that Czurlanis met the first prong
of the Connick test, the court emphasized that Czurlanis did not discuss his
own working conditions as an aggrieved employee, but rather spoke only as
4
a citizen and taxpayer at a public forum called for just such purposes."
Proceeding to the second prong of the Connick test, the court found no
evidence that Czurlanis's speech undermined the authority of his supervisor,
or that the operations of the employer were disrupted; indeed, any disruptions
that did occur were the result of his superiors' attempts to suppress his
speech." 5 The court also held that the failure to abide by the "chain of
command" was excused, finding that "[a] policy which would compel public
employees to route complaints about poor departmental practices to the very
officials responsible for those practices would impermissibly chill such
6
speech.""
Brown v. Texas A&M University"' provided a similar result. In Brown,
a university accountant reported to his supervisor a possible mishandling of
funds by a faculty member. The employee's relationship with his supervisor
deteriorated. The employee eventually resigned "under protest," claiming he
8
had suffered retaliation for speaking on the matter.1
The court held that the expression of possible financial impropriety from
one public servant to another is a matter of public concern under Connick." 9
Brown's speech, in the court's view, was not on a matter only of personal
interest, but concerned an attempt to bring to light actual or potential
wrongdoing or breach of public trust. 20 The case was remanded for further
proceedings.

112. Id. at 104.
113. Id.
114. Id.

115. Id. at 106-07.
116. Id.at 106.
117. 804 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1986).
118. Id. at 329-30.
119. Id. at 337.
120. Id. In characterizing the speech as on a matter of public concern, even though the
context in which it took place was in a one-on-one office discussion between employee and
subordinate, the court said: "It cannot be gainsaid that in our society, pervaded with the
ubiquitous and sickening spectre of governmental irregularity and mendacity, an expression
relating to possible financial improprieties by a fellow public servant is a 'matter of public
concern."' Id. See also Patteson v. Johnson, 721 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1983) (employee in state
auditor's office discharged for testifying before legislative committee that audit of governor's
office was insufficient; court held speech was on matter of public concern and remanded for
application of balancing test).
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In other decisions public employees who were not involved in any personal
dispute brought to light alleged malfeasance or abuse of office constituting,
in the courts' view, speech on matters of public concern. For example, in
Thomas v. Harris County'2' a police officer's criticism of what he perceived
to be favored treatment by the department of a private security force in a
residential subdivision was held to satisfy the first prong of the Connick
test.' Similarly, in Brockell v. Norton'21 the court held that a police officer's
telephone call to a municipal training instructor to report that a fellow
officer had a copy of an examination to be given was an issue of public
concern, noting that the public has a vital interest in the integrity of police
officers.124 In addition, in Greenberg v. Kmetko"21 a social worker's criticism
of the department's handling of certain cases, aired at a meeting of the
department's oversight board, was held to constitute speech on a matter of
public concern that outweighed the disruptive effect produced by the employee's criticism. 26 And in DiFrancov. City of Chicago2 7 a city employee's
complaints that a fellow employee was using city equipment to perform noncity work during work hours and that the mayor's husband was using cityowned photographs on his private Christmas cards were held to be protected
speech concerning the diversion of public resources for private or political
use. 128
In this second category of cases, it appears that if the speech concerns
malfeasance or abuse of office and the employee speaks as a concerned
citizen, not as an aggrieved employee, then the courts appear likely to find
that the employee has satisfied both prongs of the Connick test. Yet, where
the employee who speaks on alleged malfeasance or abuse also has a personal
dispute with his employer, the speech may not be deemed protected. Predicting the outcome in this latter category is difficult, however, as evidenced

121. 784 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1986).
122. Id. at 653. The case was remanded to determine whether the officer's speech caused his
supervisor to transfer him in retaliation. Id.
123. 732 F.2d 664 (8th Cir. 1984).
124. Id. at 668. This interest outweighed the disruptive effect caused by the officer going
outside the "chain of command" and reporting the alleged infraction directly to city authorities,
especially where, as here, the requirement that officers first bring complaints to their immediate
superiors for resolution had not been strictly enforced. Id. See also Solomon v. Royal Oak
Township, 656 F. Supp. 1254, 1262-63 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (no requirement to follow chain of
command in police department where to do so would be futile, and regulations requiring officers
to follow chain void as vague and overbroad).
125. 811 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir.), reh'g granted, 820 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1987), vacated, 840 F.2d
467 (7th Cir. 1988).
126. Id. at 1062. Stated the court: "To the extent that [the employee's] role as critic and
gadfly impeded his office performance, we believe this negative aspect was offset by the
importance his comments had in alerting the courts and state DCFS officials that their orders
were being subverted or ignored." Id.
127. 642 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
128. Id.at 247.
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by the contrary holdings in Gonzalez and Patkus. Recall that in both cases
the employee spoke out on alleged failure to follow federal requirements in
administration of an anti-poverty program, and that in both cases the
employees were involved in personal disputes with their superiors. In Gonzalez, the court held that the employee's speech was on a matter of public
concern in spite of the existence of a personal dispute; 29 in Patkus, the
court found the speech unprotected because of the dispute.'30 Thus, in this
second grouping of cases, the employee may or may not meet the first prong
of the Connick test, even if the speech concerns malfeasance or abuse of
office. And even if the speech is deemed protected, the balance that will be
struck between the competing interests of the parties under the second prong
of the Connick test is difficult to predict.
C.

Speech on Public Safety and Welfare

A third category of cases may be identified, in which an employee speaks
out on an issue that may be broadly characterized as concerning public
safety and welfare. In these cases, usually involving public safety personnel,
the employee voices concern about the ability of the employer adequately to
execute its public safety responsibilities or speaks out on employer practices
that allegedly undermine the welfare of employees.
Three recent decisions typify those concerning the question of public safety.
In Brown v. Port Authority,'3 ' a lieutenant in the security force assigned to
JFK Airport was disciplined following his writing a memo to his superiors
and his union in which he expressed the view that airport security was not
sufficient to repel terrorist activity. Although the memo also addressed the
plaintiff's personal safety concerns, noted the court, the memo essentially
concerned the ability of the airport to respond to a matter of the utmost
public concern-terrorism. 32 In Knapp v. Whitaker 33 a public school teacher
was discharged after he wrote a letter to school board members concerning,
inter alia, the failure of the school system to provide adequate liability
insurance for coaches and volunteer parents who transport students to athletic

129. 774 F.2d at 1300-01 ("[V]e do not read Connick, however, to exclude the possibility
that an issue of private concern to the employee may also be an issue of public concern.").
130. The Court stated:
Informing an entire Advisory Council of important matters relating to the program
it oversees would clearly be action similar to that of sending the telegram [and
thus protected]. But the actions and statements that occurred here more nearly
resemble a 'mere extension' of Patkus's personal dispute with specific individuals.
Actions of that sort were determined to be private and not matters of public

concern in Connick.
769 F.2d at 1257 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 148).
131. 656 F. Supp. 517 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
132. Id. at 521.
133. 757 F.2d 827 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 803 (1985).
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events. The court held that this speech concerning the adequate indemnification of volunteers was likewise a matter of public concern.'3 4 And in Koch
v, City of Hutchinson'3 a fire marshall was demoted after he released a
copy of his fire inspection report which stated that a fire had been caused
by arson, contrary to the findings of other investigators. The local newspaper
published stories of internal debate over the cause of the fire, and the city
claimed the resulting disruption of the department warranted the employee's
demotion. The court held that the release of the report aided the public in
evaluating the conduct of the government in discharging its duty to investigate
possible arson and to reduce the likelihood of fires and was thus a matter
36
of public concern.
Related to these cases are those in which the employee voices concern
about the treatment and welfare of public employees and the resulting impact
on the quality of services provided to the public. For example, in McKinley
v. City of Eloy 317 plaintiff Michael McKinley claimed his dismissal from the
city police force was in retaliation for his public criticism of the city's
decision not to give police officers an annual raise. The court held that
McKinley's speech was protected, as it
dealt with the rate of compensation for members of the city's police
force and, more generally, with the working relationship between the
police union and elected city officials. . . . [C]ompensation levels undoubtedly affect the ability of the city to attract and retain qualified
police personnel, and the competency of the police force is surely a
matter of great public concern.'38
Similarly, the court in O'Quinn v. Chambers County39 held that a police
officer's attempt to secure overtime payment under the Fair Labor Standards
Act by filing suit constituted the exercise of speech on a matter of public
concern, as congressional intent to protect the working public was at issue.1'4
In Cranford v. Moore,'4' however, the court rejected a police officer's claim
that his letter to the city manager attempting to secure overtime payment
42
for officers was protected speech.

134. Id.at 841.
135. 814 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir. 1987).
136. Id.at 1497-98.
137. 705 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1983).
138. Id. at 1114, See also American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service,
595 F. Supp. 403, 407 (D. Conn. 1984), rev'd, 766 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1046 (1986) (speech by postal employee in opposition to transfer of employees, in which
he claimed the transfers would cause delayed mail service to customers, held matter of public

concern).
139. 636 F, Supp. 1388 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
140. Id. at 1394. See also Dougherty v. Barry, 604 F. Supp. 1424 (D.D.C. 1985) (discussed
infra text accompanying notes 164-66).
141. 587 F. Supp. 712 (M.D.N.C. 1984).
142. Id. at 718. The police officer also wrote three letters to the local newspaper: the first
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Thus, a public employee who speaks on matters of public safety and
employee welfare may invoke first amendment protection against retaliatory
discharge. As in the second category of cases, however, conflicting decisions,
typified by O'Quinn and Cranford, appear.
D.

Speech on the Quality of Public Education

Numerous cases have arisen in which school teachers and university
professors have questioned actions of their employers as undermining the
quality of public education. As in the other categories of cases discussed
above, the employee is sometimes involved in a personal dispute with the
educational institution over the issue in question. The question presented is
whether the employee's speech is merely a personal disagreement with the
employer, or an issue of educational policy constituting a matter of public
concern.
In Johnson v. Lincoln University,141plaintiff William Johnson, a professor
at Lincoln University, was removed as chairman of the chemistry department. 44 Johnson had criticized the president of the university for his proposal
to reduce substantially the number of faculty positions, which would, in
Johnson's view, lower the academic standards of the university. Indeed,
Johnson "was apparently 'in the forefront of the faculty dissidents and was
quite outspoken in his criticism of [the university's president]."' 145 Johnson's
criticism took two forms: controversies within the chemistry department,
which were marked by shouting and name-calling incidents, and letters to
the Middle States Association of Schools.
The court held that both the angry speech at department meetings and
the letters to the Association constituted speech on matters of public concern.
In evaluating the content, form, and context in which the speech took place,
the court cited the Supreme Court's ruling in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District146 for the proposition that "[i]n an
academic environment, suppression of speech or opinion cannot be justified
by an 'undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance." ' 47 The court
remanded the case for further proceedings on the questions of striking the

proposed a new method of electing aldermen, the second criticized the aldermen for approving
a nuclear power plant, and the third stressed the importance of citizens being able to openly
criticize the executive branch of the United States government. The officer was terminated two
months later, ostensibly for giving preferential treatment to some citizens in writing parking
tickets. The court found an insufficient nexus between the officer's letter-writing activity and
his termination. Id.
143. 776 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1985).
144. Id. at 448.
145. Id. (quoting Trotman v. Board of Trustees of Lincoln Univ., 635 F.2d 216, 221 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 936 (1981)).
146. 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
147. Johnson, 776 F.2d at 453-54 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
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balance of interests and determining the cause of Johnson's demotion.
An opposite result was reached on comparable facts in Landrum v. Eastern
Kentucky University.148 In Landrum, a professor claimed he was denied
tenure for his expression of multiple criticisms of the dean and department
head. The court held that the speech essentially concerned the employee's
personal disputes, and that even if some of the expression involved matters
of public concern, the university's interest in "conduct[ing] its affairs without
constant disruptions due to factionalism and machinations of troublemakers"
149
outweighed the employee's freedom of expression.
Similar conflicts appear in cases concerning public school employees. In
Jett v. Dallas Independent School District,50 Norman Jett claimed his

dismissal from his position as football coach was in retaliation for his
comments, published in the local newspaper, that only two athletes at his
school could meet NCAA academic eligibility requirements. The court held
that Jett's remarks concerned "the academic development of public high

school football players" and "certainly addresse[d] matters of concern to
the community.''5 The court resolved the Connick balance in the employee's

favor. Also, in Lees v. West Greene School District,152 plaintiff Karen Lees,
a substitute school teacher, claimed her failure to be selected for a permanent

position was in retaliation for her speaking at a school board meeting against
the proposed transfer of a social studies teacher to an English teaching

position. Lees argued that the transfer would undermine the quality of
instruction in English, and that the position should be filled by someone
with background as an English teacher. 53 The court held that Lees's speech
addressed the quality of education in public schools and was thus on a
matter of public concern. 5 4 And in Roberts v. Van Buren Public Schools,'55

148. 578 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Ky. 1984).
149. Id. at 246. See also Jordan v. Board of Regents, Univ. System, 583 F. Supp. 23, 28
(S.D. Ga. 1983) (personal complaints about the internal operation of the university not protected
speech); Ballard v. Blount, 581 F. Supp. 160, 163-64 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (faculty member's
grievance concerning the amount of his salary increase, the method of assigning freshman
English courses, the appropriateness of a course syllabus, and the procedures for review and
approval of course syllabi held to constitute speech on personal, not public, concern); Mahaffey
v. Board of Regents, 562 F. Supp. 887, 890 (D. Kan. 1983) (faculty member's advocacy of
creating separate department for his area and publicizing to class a student's paper critical of
certain administrative decisions within the department are "quintessentially" matters of individual, not public, concern).
150. 798 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1986).
151. Id.at 758.
152. 632 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
153. Id. It should be noted that Lees had a background in teaching English; obviously, then,
she had a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute as a likely candidate for the position.
Id.

154. Id. at 1331. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding unresolved
factual issues with regard to the question of causation for plaintiff's non-appointment. In
evaluating the second prong of the Connick test as applied to this case, the court focused on
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a teacher's complaint about the sacrifice of books to allow expenditure for
other classroom supplies was held to be a matter of public concern.1 6 Finally,
in Piver v. Pender County Board of Education,1S7 a North Carolina school
teacher's criticism of the school board's proposal to dismiss his principal
was held to be protected speech. The Fourth Circuit apparently abandoned
5
its narrow standard, announced only a year earlier in Daniels v. Quinn, 1
that only speech alleging malfeasance or abuse of office was protected. Stated
the court:
Pickering, its antecedents, and its progeny-particularly Connick-make
it plain that the "public concern" or "community interest" inquiry is
better designed-and more concerned-to identify a narrow spectrum of
employee speech that is not entitled even to qualified protection than it
is to set outer limits on all that is. The principle that emerges is that all
public employee speech that by content is within the general protection
of the first amendment is entitled to at least qualified protection against
public employer chilling action except that which, realistically viewed, is
of purely "personal concern" to the employee-most typically, a private
personnel grievance. The focus is therefore upon whether the "public"
or the "community" is likely to be truly concerned with or interested in
the particular expression, or whether it is more properly viewed as
essentially a "private" matter between employer and employee.1 9
By contrast, the court in Renfroe v. Kirkpatrick'60 held that a non-tenured
teacher's claim that she was not rehired because she had filed a grievance
asserting her interest in keeping a full-time job (rather than entering a
proposed time-share arrangement) was not protected speech. The court
construed the teacher's speech as amounting to no more than a personal
dispute, noting that the mere fact the teacher asserted that hiring her fulltime would enhance the welfare of the students was not enough to make

the lack of a close working relationship between the teacher and the board. The court stated
that "[n]o persuasive argument can be made that the Plaintiff's work relationship with the
school board requires her loyalty and confidence in order for her to properly function as a
teacher. Certainly, it is unlikely at best that her job performance was seriously undermined by
her speech." Id. at 1332 (citations omitted). See also Loya v. Desert Sands Unified School
Dist., 721 F.2d 279, 281-82 (9th Cir. 1983) (teacher's remarks in local newspaper that school
system not meeting needs of Mexican children and school board not making efforts to recruit
minority teachers held speech on matter of general public interest, as speech was about the
preferable manner of operating the school system).
155. 773 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1985).
156. Id. at 956. The court stated that a teacher may certainly speak on the allocation of
public funds, even if that speech is made in a grievance. The fact that the speech was made in
private as part of a grievance may be taken into account in striking the balance of interests,
but not in determining whether the speech is a matter of public concern. Id.
157. 835 F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1987).
158. 801 F.2d at 690. See also supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
159. Piver, 835 F.2d at 1079-80 (quoting Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998-99 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2278 (1986)).
160. 722 F.2d 714 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).
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this a matter of public concern.' 61 And in Daniels, the court held that a
complaint by a teacher's aide about the late arrival of textbooks was not
62
protected speech under Connick.'
Thus, several decisions recognize complaints aired by teachers and profes-

sors involving the quality of academic services as speech on a matter of
public concern. Certainly, however, the cases turn on fine distinctions: The
employee complaint about the inadequate facilites (missing textbooks) held
to be a personal dispute in Daniels is difficult to distinguish from the

teacher's complaint about the inadequate facilities (discontinued books) held
to be a matter of public concern in Roberts. Similarly, the result in Landrum

is difficult to reconcile with the result in Johnson, as both involve speech
on how well a university was run, but only one was held to be protected.

Again, while one can generally state that speech on the quality of public
education is a matter of public concern, it is not at all clear which statements

will be found to fit that category.
E.

Speech Concerning Discrimination

Another category of cases involve speech by employees concerning dis-

crimination because of race, sex, or union membership. With the Supreme
63
Court's ruling in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District

that allegations of discriminatory practices made in a one-on-one meeting
between a teacher and her principal were protected speech, the door was

opened for other employees similarly to assert that their claims of discrimination constituted speech on a matter of public concern.
In Dougherty v. Barry' 4 plaintiff Edward Dougherty, a white fire fighter
formerly employed by the District of Columbia, claimed he was passed over

for promotion due, in part, to his participation in a rally held to protest
discriminatory promotion policies of the District government. 65 The court
cited Givhan and Connick to support its finding that Dougherty's partici-

161. Id. at 715. See also Derrickson v. Board of Educ., 738 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1984) (even
assuming teacher's criticism of school administration touched on matters of public concern and
activities motivated by genuine concern for improving quality of education, his inability to work
harmoniously with others warranted his dismissal); Gregory v. Durham County Bd. of Educ.,
591 F. Supp. 145 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (essence of plaintiff teacher's complaint was a conflict
between mandatory teacher training program and her planned vacation; fact that teacher's letter
protesting requirement she attend training also expressed dissatisfaction with school administration did not make the letter speech on a matter of public concern).
162. 801 F.2d at 690. The court stated that although certain conditions at school, including
the late arrival of books, can be argued to be of public concern inasmuch as they affect the
adequacy of the educational program, they are best resolved by school boards and administrators,
not federal courts. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
163. 439 U.S. 410, 413 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
164. 604 F. Supp. 1424 (D.D.C. 1985).
165. Id. at 1428-31.
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pation in the rally was speech entitled to protection under the first amendment, and that his failure to be promoted was attributable, in part, to his
speech.'
Similarly, in Pollard v. City of Chicago'6 7 plaintiff Henry Pollard alleged
he was suspended and involuntarily transferred as a result of concerns he
voiced to his supervisor that a black woman co-worker was the target of
sexual and racial harassment by other employees. The court held that
Pollard's "speech identifying potentially actionable discrimination by government employees constitutes a matter of j ublic concern."'1 And in O'Connor v. Peru State College 69 the complaints of the women's physical education
instructor concerning the inadequacy of facilities for the women's basketball
team were held to constitute speech on a matter of public concern in that
170
they raised the issue of equal treatment for women athletes.
By contrast, in a number of cases an employee's claim that individual
allegations of discrimination constitute protected speech has been held to be
no more than a private dispute with the employer. For example, in Lipsey
v. Chicago Cook County Criminal Justice Commission,'7 ' plaintiff Robert
Lipsey claimed his termination as an assistant planner was in retaliation for
a letter he wrote to his supervisor complaining he was underpaid because he
was black. Lipsey claimed the letter was protected speech concerning the
agency's policy of race discrimination. Differentiating this case from that
noted above, the court said:
[Tlhis court is aware that Lipsey's right to protest race'discrimination in
a department of state government is a "matter inherently of public
concern." The court is also aware that Lipsey does not forfeit that right
when he conveys the message to his superiors in a private forum. The
court is not convinced, however, that Lipsey's comments, in the factual
setting they were made, took on the character of general allegations of
race discrimination practiced in the department or by the department
supervisors. The content of the memorandum (cited earlier) reveals that
it was made as part of a salary dispute. It does not identify other persons
who have been subjected to such treatment. It does not state that there
is a department policy that prevents him from getting better assignments,
more money, or better working hours. It narrows in on his personal
qualifications and interests, and directs his personal dissatisfaction in his

166. Id. at 1437-39. The court also found that the city failed to promote Dougherty because
he had filed complaints of discrimination with the city's office of human rights. Id. at 1438.
167. 643 F. Supp. 1244 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
168. Id. at 1249. See also Patterson v. Masem, 594 F. Supp. 386 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (speech
by school teacher in opposition to production of high school play she thought racist held
protected; however, causal link between speech and denial of promotion not proved), aff'd,
774 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1985).
169. 605 F. Supp. 753 (D. Neb. 1985), aff'd 781 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1986).
170. Id. at 763. The court found no nexus between the instructor's speech and the nonrenewal of her contract, however. Id.
1986).
171. 638 F. Supp. 837 (N.D. Ill.
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compensation to his immediate supervisor and blames his poor pay on
his supervisor's racial animus. The dispute is personal; the target is
Lipsey's supervisor. Lipsey did not speak "as a citizen upon matters of
public concern.' '172

Similarly, individual claims of employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual preference have been held to be mere personal disputes. In Johnson

v. Orr7 1 a former Air Force Reserve officer was discharged after she sent a
letter to her commanding officer declaring herself a homosexual. The court
held that the officer was not discharged in violation of her free speech rights
because the letter was on "a matter personal to herself and was not a

communication or advocacy of a citizen upon matters of public concern."' 7 4
And in Rowland v. Mad River Local School District75 a discharged guidance

counselor's statement to her co-workers and supervisor that she was bisexual
was likewise held to be a personal matter and thus outside the ambit of
Connick's protection.

76

Where, however, employees can demonstrate that

they spoke as citizens "espousing 'or denouncing' either side of the debate
[on homosexual employment] it would certainly appear that [their] comments
77
would be protected by the first amendment."'
Related to these cases are those in which the speech concerns allegations

of discrimination based not on race or sex, but rather on union activity. In
American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service,178 a postal

worker, Joseph Gordon, was discharged after he wrote a column in a union
newsletter in which he stated that while he was sorting the mail he had read
an anti-union appeal from Congressman Phillip Crane and urged his coworkers to combat Crane's efforts.

79

Gordon's discharge was based on his

admission in the column that he had read the mail while sorting it, in
80
violation of Postal Service regulations.

172. Id. at 841-42 (citations omitted).
173. 617 F. Supp. 170 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 787 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1986).
174. Id. at 176.
175. 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
176. Id. at 449. Judge Edwards dissented, noting that although the initial disclosure of
bisexuality by the employee was made in confidence, her repeated statements to others were
part of an effort to establish the right to keep working despite her sexual preference. Since the
speech to others was spread to others and became the focus of community debate, it "became
a part of the nationwide debate on homosexuality and the rights or lack thereof of homosexuals"
and thus was on a matter of public concern. Id. at 452-53 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
177. Johnson, 617 F. Supp. at 176-77. See also National Gay Taskforce v. Board of Educ.,
729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), aff'd, 470 U.S. 903 (1985); Shalom v. Secretary
of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wisc. 1980).
178. 830 F.2d 294 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
179. Id. at 297.
180. Id. at 298. Interestingly, Gordon printed a retraction in the next issue of the newsletter,
stating that he had not actually read Crane's letter while sorting the mail, but rather had been
informed of the letter by a co-worker. Id.
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The court held that Gordon was dismissed in violation of his free speech
rights. Applying the first prong of the Connick standard, the court held that
Gordon's speech addressed a matter of public concern:
Gordon's column, entitled "Workers of the World Unite," was exclusively concerned with efforts to reinvigorate the trade union movement
and, more specifically, to combat the threat to organized labor from
"right to work" laws. The urge to unionize certainly falls within the
category of expression that is "fairly considered as relating to any matter
of political, social, or other concern to the community." ' ,,1
The court then applied the second prong of Connick and held that the
employee's interest in speaking on this issue outweighed the government's
interest in maintaining the "public's confidence in the confidentiality of the
8 2
mailstream," as no harm to that confidence had been demonstrated.
Applying Mt. Healthy, the court concluded that Gordon's dismissal would
not have occurred but for his protected conduct and rejected the employer's
proffered reliance on violation of regulations to justify his dismissal." 3
By contrast, the court in Santella v. Grishaber'1 held that a police officer's
attempt to characterize his grievance concerning unfair and ineffective employment practices by the city (and thus on matters of public concern) was
misdirected, as the grievance concerned only the application of certain
employment practices to him." 5 And in Lynn v. Smith'8 6 the court held that
a union steward's grievances over travel time, overtime, and leave requests
were of a purely personal nature; nonetheless, the court found that one
grievance claiming invasion of employee privacy "may be construed as
involving a matter of public concern."'n
Thus, where an employee's speech addresses general concerns of discriminatory policies or- practices by public employers, not limited to individual
allegations of discrimination, the courts may hold that the speech is on a

181. Id. at 301 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146).
182. Id. at 303. See also Wilton v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 772 F.2d 88 (4th
Cir. 1985) (correctional officers at city jail protested union membership and activities as barriers
to their promotion); GavrilIes v. O'Connor, 579 F. Supp. 301 (D. Mass. 1984) (claims of
harassment for filing union grievances violates first amendment right to association).
183. American Postal Workers, 830 F.2d at 311.
184. 654 F. Supp. 428 (N.D. Il. 1987). The court found that Santella's grievance, in which
he asserted his employer wrongfully failed to give him the supervisory title he had been promised
when he accepted a new position and that his employer harassed him when he threatened to
file a grievance, was speech only on a particular employment decision that affected him. Id. at
435. "Even assuming that adverse employment decision was unfair or inefficient, Santella's
challenge via the grievance process was not thereby transformed into a matter of public concern."
Id. See also Gaj v. U.S. Postal Serv., 800 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1986) (employee claims that he was
denied employment because of his safety complaints and union activities held not rising to level
of speech on a matter of public concern).
185. 654 F. Supp. at 435.
186. 628 F. Supp. 283 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
187. Id. at 290.
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matter of public concern. Yet no clear guidance emerges from the decisions
to predict with certainty whether speech in this area vill
be deemed protected
as the courts retain significant discretion in characterizing the speech as
concerning merely personal versus public interest.
F.

Matters of Purely Personal Interest

As already noted in the preceding sections, the courts have refused to
extend first amendment protection to speech on matters of purely personal
interest, consistent with Connick's admonition that "government offices
could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional
matter."' 8 8 This section provides a brief overview of representative decisions,
other than those already noted, in which speech by a public employee failed
to meet the first prong of the Connick test because it was on a matter of
personal concern. These cases fall at the other end of Justice White's
spectrum of speech discussed above.
In Alinovi v. Worcester School Committee189 a school teacher posted three
letters from the school board on parents' night concerning her refusal to
turn over a student case study she had written to her principal and the
board's proposal to discipline her for that refusal. The court held that the
employee's purpose in posting the letters was to bring about a resolution to
her own disciplinary problem, not to inform parents about how the school
board operated. 190 Similarly, in Day v. South Park Independent School
District'9' the court held that a teacher's letters to school administration
officials protesting the negative performance evaluation given her by the
principal was purely a private matter. 92 By contrast, the court in Wells v.
Hico Independent School District93 held that a teacher's protest to the school
board of her poor performance evaluation pertained in part to matters of
public concern, as the teacher showed the evaluation was in retaliation for
her work in a "Right to Read" program not favored by her supervisor. 94
5 the plaintiff,
In Murray v. Gardner'"
an FBI special agent, criticized at
an all-employee meeting the bureau's lottery method to determine layoffs
and was subsequently disciplined. The court held that the agent's comments

188. 461 U.S. at 143.
189. 777 F.2d 776 (lst Cir. 1985).
190. Id. at 786-87.
191. 768 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1985).
192. Id. at 700. See also Gearhart v. Thorne, 768 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff's
grievance refuting charges of ineptitude not speech on a matter of public concern); Lehpamer
v. Troyer, 601 F. Supp. 1466 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (police officer's suspension not in retaliation for
speaking out against poor evaluation; individual performance evaluation a purely personal matter
not protected under Connick).
193. 736 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 901 (1985).
194. Id. at 249.
195. 741 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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dealt only with an individual dispute, and that the speech had "no relevance
' 96
to the public's evaluation of the performance of governmental agencies.'
Stated another way, "the role of the whistle-blower merits protection; the
197
expressions of personal dissatisfaction by a discontented employee do not."'
By contrast, the court in Egger v, Phillips98 held that an FBI agent's
allegations of corruption in the Indianapolis office extended beyond his own
poor working relationship with his supervisor to implicate public concerns
about the effectiveness of the FBI.' 99
Although both cases involved free speech claims by FBI agents, the
differing circumstances of the cases and the fact that they were decided in
different circuits may explain, in part, the different outcomes. The Murray
decision, however, is particularly noteworthy when compared to another
decision, Krodel v. Young,w rendered by the same court shortly thereafter.
In Krodel, persistent criticism of practices and procediures by a management
analyst at the Social Security Administration was found to "conceivably"
constitute a matter of public concern. 201 However, the court did not reach
the Connick balancing test because the employee had not pursued his
2
available administrative remedies before filing suit. 02
Perhaps the most frequent reason cited by the courts for finding speech
outside the ambit of Connick is that the speech arose as part of a grievance.
For example, in Cook v. Ashmore23 plaintiff Phillip Cook was notified in
1980 that his employment as director of a college continuing education
program would be terminated because he had not generated sufficient funds.
Cook filed a grievance with the college, claiming his termination was not
made with adequate notice. The college sustained his grievance, and his
employment was extended to the following year without renewal. 204 Cook
claimed the failure to renew his contract was in retaliation for his having
filed the grievance, in violation of his free speech rights. The court held that
the grievance on the amount of notice due Cook was clearly a matter of
personal, not public, concern, and thus failed to meet the first prong of the
Connick test. 250 Similar results were reached in Simon v. City of Clute,-1 in
which a written grievance presented to the city council by a group of former
and current police officers alleging favoritism and arrogance by the police

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 438 (quoting McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983).
Murray, 741 F.2d at 438.
710 F.2d 292 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918 (1983).
710 F.2d at 317.
748 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 711-12.
Id.
579 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

204. Id. at 80-81.
205. Id. at 84.
206. 646 F. Supp. 1280 (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd, 825 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1987).
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chief was held to be a mere personal complaint; in Singh v. Lamar University,2 in which a plaintiff's claim that he was denied tenure in response
to his having successfully grieved previous adverse promotion decisions was

held to constitute a matter of purely personal interest; and in Sipes v. United
States,208 in which an employee's claims of retaliation for complaints of
unequal treatment of employees for similar offenses were held to be no more

than personal concerns about personnel actions affecting his employment. 209
The fact that an employee's speech was made in the context of a grievance
is not dispositive, however. 210 Rather, the critical inquiry is whether the
substance of the grievance, taken as a whole, "deals with individual personnel
disputes and grievances . . . of no relevance to the public's evaluation of

the performance of governmental agencies, [or] concerns 'issues about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society' to

207. 635 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
208. 744 F.2d 1418 (10th Cir. 1984).
209. See also Saye v. St. Vrain Valley School Dist. RE-1J, 785 F.2d 862, 866 (10th Cir.
1986) (teacher's complaints to parents about cut-back on student aide time held extension of
her personal dispute with principal, not matter of public concern); Lewis v. Blackburn, 759
F.2d 1171, 1172 (4th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (protest by magistrate to judge and legislators
concerning assignment of additional duties held matter of self-interest, "not public-spirited
concern over administration of justice," as stated in dissent to original panel opinion, 734 F.2d
1000, 1010 (4th Cir. 1984)); Davis v. West Community Hosp., 755 F.2d 455, 461-62 (5th Cir.
1985) (surgeon with staff privileges at community hospital criticized hospital personnel and
claimed ineffective treatment of patients; speech held to involve only personal grievances against
various co-workers and administrators); Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1985) (claim
of retaliation for submission of claim for overtime pay a matter of purely personal interest);
Altman v. Hurst, 734 F.2d 1240, 1244 (7th Cir. 1984) (officer's urging another officer to appeal
suspension not speech on matter of public concern, but a private personnel dispute); Thompson
v. McDowell, 661 F. Supp. 498, 500 (E.D. Ky. 1987) (statement that agency needed a 24-hour
deadline for equipment repairs, that it did not divide its budget fairly, and that the agency
should buy only the best equipment at a fair price was an expression of purely personal interest;
"[]ust because the expenditure of public funds is tangentially implicated does not entitle the
expression to protection"); Lehpamer, 601 F. Supp. 1466 (police officer's speech on his poor
evaluation not speech on matter of public concern, but a personal grievance on personnel
matters that do not directly affect the public); Ferrara v. Mills, 596 F. Supp. 1069, 1071 (S.D.
Fla. 1984) (complaint by school teacher about class assignments and hiring of athletic coaches
to teach social studies, "while tangentially related to matters of public concern, constitutes
nothing more than a series of grievances with school administrators over internal school
policies"); Owens v. City of Derby, 586 F. Supp. 37, 41 (D. Kan. 1984) (police officer's
grievance critical of mayor and other city officials outside ambit of Connick because it relates
to ongoing dispute between plaintiff and his employer, and "speech related primarily to a
personal employment dispute is not protected by the First Amendment"); Cook v. Ashmore,
579 F. Supp. 78, 80 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (grievance concerning amount of advance notice due
before dismissal is not a matter of public concern); Ballard v. Blount, 581 F. Supp. 160, 163
(N.D. Ga. 1983) (professor's claims of retaliation for speech concerning course assignments,
salary increase, and inappropriate syllabus for course held a personal dispute).
210. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 ("Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of
public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record."). See also Davis, 755 F.2d at 461 ("The fact, then, that the
communications here were inhouse does not necessarily destroy their protection under the First
Amendment .... ").
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make informed decisions about the operation of their government. ' 21 And,
indeed, there are a few instances in which speech made in the context of a
grievance has been held protected under the first prong of the Connick
test.212 By and large, however, it is difficult for an employee to overcome
the threshold determination required by Connick that the speech address a
matter of public concern when that speech is made in a grievance.
III.

ALTERNATIVES TO CONNICK AND CONTINUED CONFUSION

As demonstrated by the decisions discussed in Part II, lower federal courts
have been anything but consistent in their determination of what speech is
protected under Connick v. Myers.2 3 Although broad categories of cases
can be identified, there exist contradictions within every category, leaving
public employees and employers confused as to the scope of their free speech
rights and responsibilities. As aptly noted by Professor Massaro, 214 the
problem lies in the almost unbridled discretion given the courts under Connick
in determining what speech is on a matter of public concern. Massaro states,
"In an effort to contain the effects of its decision to apply the Constitution
to public employers, the Court has fashioned doctrine that is vague [and]
,,211
internally inconsistent ....
What alternatives are appropriate for consideration? At least three are
possible, as discussed below.
First, the courts could continue to apply the Connick two-pronged test on
a case-by-case basis, thus establishing a substantial body of precedent over
time. As more varying factual situations arose for resolution, the categories
of cases noted above would become more refined, and other categories would
undoubtedly emerge. The practitioner could perhaps be more likely, with
diligent research, to discover a case which paralleled his own to the point
that the outcome could be predicted. This alternative, then, is merely to
maintain the status quo, with the expectation that over time this area of law
will become more settled.
The problem with this alternative, however, is twofold. First, it is impossible to address all the circumstances in which the question of speech on a
matter of public concern may arise. 2 6 Second, even under existing precedent
there is substantial contradiction, and there is no reason to anticipate that

211. McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1114 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1946)).
212. See Lynn, 628 F. Supp. at 290 (grievance by shop steward alleging invasion of privacy
may be construed as involving matter of public concern); Roberts, 773 F.2d at 956 (grievance
by teacher over allocation of funds a matter of public concern).
213. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
214. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61
S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1987).
215. Id. at 25.
216. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968).
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this conflict will subside over time. Thus, the problem of different courts
reaching different results under similar circumstances will continue as long
as the broad discretion afforded judges under Connick remains the applicable
standard.
As a variation on this first alternative, the Supreme Court could, using
an appropriate case as a vehicle, grant certiorari to give additional guidance
on what constitutes a matter of public concern under the first prong of the
Connick test. For example, the Court could clarify the significance, if any,
of the fact that an employee speaks as a school teacher on a curriculum
issue rather than as a citizen on a zoning dispute. The problem, again, is
that even with additional guidance to the lower courts, the myriad of factual
settings that will arise and the broad discretion granted the court under the
existing Connick standard ensure that similar cases will be judged differently.
A second alternative has recently been suggested by Professor Massaro,
under which the Connick standard is abandoned in favor of a two-step
217
approach that does not distinguish between public and private speech.
Under Massaro's proposal, step one would determine whether the speech
would be "permissible 'street corner' discourse"; 2 8 if not, government regulation of the speech would be warranted. If the speech were of the type
that a given citizen could otherwise express, then step two is an examination
of the circumstances to weigh the government's interest in restricting speech
against the citizen/employee's first amendment interests.21 9 Massaro's proposal, while correctly identifying the problem of overly broad discretion of
the courts in determining what constitutes a matter of public concern,
completely eliminates the public concern variable from the equation. As
such, Massaro's proposal represents a substantial departure from the premise
22 0
originally set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education
: that the first
amendment interest to be protected is that public employees be allowed to
exercise the right "they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on
matters of public interest . . . . "
Total elimination of the public concern aspect of public employee free
speech analysis goes too far. A third alternative is to retain the principle set
forth in Pickering that public employee speech rises to the level of first
amendment protection only if it is in the realm of public matters, but to
return that principle to its proper place in the equation. Simply stated, the
effect of the Connick two-pronged test is to emphasize unduly the first prong
of the inquiry; by affording the courts the opportunity to decide close cases
on the first prong of the test-that is, to rule as a matter of law that the

217. Massaro, supra note 214, at 67.
218. Id.

219. Id.
220. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
221. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
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matter is not one of public concern-the harder question of proper resolution
of interests may be avoided. As recently noted by the Eleventh Circuit:
[I]n most instances speech of a public employee will have aspects or
subjects that are worthy of paramount protection under the First Amendment, as well as aspects or subjects that are not worthy of such heightened
protection. The task under Pickering is to balance those competing
interests and to determine whether the employee's interests in the speech
as a whole outweigh the public employer's interests. The approach taken
by the district court here [applying the first prong of the Connick test]
shortcircuited that balancing process by avoiding the hard choices inherent
in the Pickering equation.-

A better alternative is to return to the standard originally set forth in
Pickering, under which the court is required to address the question of
whether the speech is on a matter of public concern as part of the broader
inquiry into balancing the respective interests of the parties, not as a threshold
inquiry. There is little doubt that the effect of Connick has been to narrow
the free speech rights of public employees, primarily through the requirement
that a court examine the context in which the speech arose as part of the
threshold determination.2
Moreover, under the continuum of speech set forth by Justice White in
Connick, it is not enough that the speech address a matter of public concern
because some matters are more protected than others.224 A better approach
is to err on the side of first amendment interests of employees and assume
that speech is on a matter of public concern in close cases, recognizing that
if legitimate goveinmental interests in suppression can be articulated, the
ultimate balance will be struck in favor of the employer.
To illustrate the difference in these three alternatives, the article reexamines
Jurgensen v. Fairfax County2 under each approach. Once again, the speech
in question in Jurgensen was an internal report on problems in a county
emergency response office released by a police officer to the Washington
Post. The Fourth Circuit, applying the first prong of the Connick standard,
held that the internal report released by Officer Jurgensen was "at best [of]
limited public concern . . . ,,,226
but the court nonetheless proceeded to
222. Eiland v. City of Montgomery, 797 F.2d 953, 957 (11th Cir. 1986).
223. See 461 U.S. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally Gonzalez v. Benavides, 774
F.2d 1295, 1303 (5th Cir. 1985); Jurgensen v. Fairfax County, 745 F.2d 868, 879 (4th Cir.
1984); Landrum v. Eastern Kentucky Univ., 578 F. Supp. 241, 247 (E.D. Ky. 1984); Massaro,
supra note 214, at 16; Note, Connick v. Myers: Narrowing the Free Speech Right of Public
Employees, 33 CAmT. U.L. Rv. 429, 448 (1984); Developments in the Law-Public Employment,
97 HARv. L. REv. 1611, 1761 (1984); Note, Public Employees and the First Amendment:
Connick v. Myers, 15 LoY. U. Cm. L.J. 293, 305 (1984); Note, Constitutional Law-Supreme
Court Restricts First Amendment Rights of Public Employees-Connick v. Myers, 58 TrL. L.
Rzv. 831, 840 (1984).
224. 461 U.S. at 147.
225. 745 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1984).
226. Id. at 888.
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apply the second prong of Connick to balance the limited first amendment
interest of Jurgensen against the employer's interest in disciplining him for
releasing the report in violation of county regulations.27 The court struck
the balance in favor of the employer, given that under the first prong of
Connick, "[t]he report in this case had no more the quality of a matter of
public concern than the language of the plaintiff in Connick . . . .
The first alternative's approach, continuing the application of Connick, is
typified by Judge Ervin in his concurring opinion in Jurgensen, in which he
found the court's discussion of the second prong of Connick unnecessary,
as the first prong was dispositive. Judge Ervin stated:
Being convinced that once a determination has been made that the
expression under scrutiny does not deal with a matter of 'public concern,'
it is neither necessary nor appropriate to engage in such 'interest balancing.' I prefer to base the decision solely upon the ground that the audit
report did not deal with a matter of 'public concern.'2
Thus, under the first alternative approach, the court, having determined that
the report released by Jurgensen was no more than an internal agency matter,
was to go no further in its analysis. There was no need for inquiry into the
effect of releasing the report on Jurgensen's ability to discharge his duties
as a police officer, or on the ability of the Fairfax County Police Department
to maintain discipline and order. The result, under the first alternative, is a
ruling for the defendant employer because Jurgensen did not speak on a
matter of public concern.
Under the second alternative proposed by Massaro, the report is first
examined not to determine whether it addresses a matter of public concern,
but to determine whether the contents would be "permissible 'street corner'
discourse. ' 230 Clearly, the audit report findings do not fall into that narrow
band of topics, such as obscenity, that the government may regulate through
criminal sanctions; as such, the report satisfies Massaro's first test. Note
that under Massaro's alternative, the court is unlikely to encounter speech
that may be termed outside the scope of "permissible 'street corner'
discourse" 23' frequently, and thus, unlike alternative one, will not readily
dispose of the case under the first prong.
Once the first prong of the Massaro alternative has been answered in
favor of the employee, the second prong requires the government to demonstrate that its reasons for disciplining the employee promote valid and
important government interests sufficient to outweigh the protected speech.332

227. Id. at 888-89.
228. Id. at 888.
229. Id. at 891 (Ervin, J., concurring).
230. Massaro, supra note 214, at 67.
231. Id.
232. Id. "The Mount Healthy holding would continue to apply, so that discipline that would
have been imposed despite the protected speech still would be allowed." Id. at 68.
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Note that Massaro places the burden of proof on the employer. Applying
this second prong to Jurgensen, Fairfax County must demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the court that in enforcing the regulation prohibiting release
of audit reports and disciplining Jurgensen for insubordination, it promoted
valid and important government interests-here, maintaining discipline and
obedience to orders in the police department.233 Since Jurgensen's speech is
deemed protected under the first prong of the Massaro test, the burden on
the employer in justifying the discipline is substantially greater than under
the Connick model, in that his act of "insubordination" is no more than
exercising his free speech right. The result, under the second alternative, is
a ruling for the plaintiff employee because the employer cannot show that
disciplining the employee promoted an important government interest suffi234
cient to outweigh Jurgensen's free speech right.
Under the third alternative, the nature of Jurgensen's speech is considered
part of the overall inquiry into the interests of the parties. Thus, the content
and context of Jurgensen's speech are evaluated in light of his first amendment right to comment on an issue of public concern, and are weighed
against the employer's interest in efficiency. As required by Pickering, the
parties' working relationship, the detrimental effect of the speech, and the
nature of the issue upon which the employee spoke are considered. 2 5 Judge
Butzner, in his dissent in Jurgensen, strikes the balance in favor of the
employee; the findings in his dissent furnish the basis for evaluation of this
26
case under the third alternative.
The overall inquiry into the interests of the parties must begin with the
realization that Jurgensen released the audit report only after a protracted
period following its departmental circulation in which no corrective action
was taken . 37 The report was given to the newspaper reporter as a small part
of Jurgensen's lengthy discussions with the press concerning deficiencies in
the emergency operations center and the resulting danger to the public safety.
Indeed, the majority opinion in Jurgensen acknowledged that his overall
campaign to call attention to these deficiencies by complaining to his superiors
and coworkers, and by speaking at a public meeting of the Civil Service
Commission, was a valid exercise of his free speech right. 2 8

233. 745 F.2d at 888.
234. The Jurgensen court found ample evidence to support the employer in disciplining the
employee, because the speech was not deemed protected. Thus, under Mount Healthy Jurgensen
was not able to show that his free speech activities were the "but for" or "motivating" cause
of his demotion; rather, the disciplinary action was for violating the regulation, irrespective of
the contents of the report. 745 F.2d at 887-88. Under Massaro's test, however, the Mount
Healthy standard would be resolved in favor of the employee, since the report would be deemed
protected speech, and its release was the "but for" cause of his demotion.
235. See supra notes 10-37 and accompanying text.
236. 745 F.2d at 891 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 887.
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The Pickering factors support the coiclusion that the speech was protected.
The parties' working relationship was not unduly impaired by release of the
report; even though Jurgensen was a supervisor, and "he realized that his
action would likely displease his superiors .

. . ."29

there was no evidence

that Jurgensen's performance declined or that his loyalty to the department
was suspect after release of the report. 24° Nor was there any detrimental
effect of the speech demonstrated: "An expert witness, who had years of
experience in law enforcement and administration, testified that making the
report available to the press would not damage the police department, that
it dealt largely with managerial problems, and that similar reports are
frequently made available to the press."' 24 Finally, the nature of the issue
upon which the employee spoke (here, the effectiveness of the emergency
response center) and the relationship of the employee to the issue (here, an
employee of the center "most likely to have informed and definite opinions"
on the matter)242 compel the conclusion that Jurgensen's speech addresses
substantial questions of public safety and welfare, and is thus on a matter
243
of public concern.
Evaluating the speech in the context set forth above, alternative three
results in a ruling for the employee. As stated by Judge Butzner:
Upon consideration of the record, I conclude that Jurgensen's interest
as a citizen, in disclosing the report to the press, outweighed the interest
of the county, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
communications center through its orders, including those restricting
access to the press. Jurgensen disclosed a matter of public interest. He
did not merely voice a personal opinion, colored by his own perceptions
of the condition of the Center. On the contrary, his disclosure of the
Center's problems rested on an authoritative report that revealed in great
detail the inefficiencies of the Center and recommended steps, including
the expenditure of public funds, to remedy them.-

Further, Judge Butzner concluded that Jurgensen met his burden of proof
under Mt. Healthy,245 as his conduct in furnishing the report was protected,
and the act of furnishing the report was the motivating or "but for" factor
leading to his discipline. 6
Alternative one clearly favors the employer. By evaluating the speech
separately and apart from the interests of the parties, an undue burden is
placed on the employee. Further,, if the court concludes that the speech is
239. Id. at 892 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
240. Id.
241. Id. There was even an opinion ventured by this expert that release of the report to the
public would ultimately have a beneficial effect on the department. Id.
242. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72.

243.
244.
245.
246.

See supra notes
745 F.2d at 894
See supra notes
745 F.2d at 896

131-42 and accompanying text.
(Butzner, J., dissenting).
23-42 and accompanying text.
(Butzner, J., dissenting).
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not on a matter of public concern under the first prong of alternative one,
no further inquiry into the interests of the parties is required.
Alternative two, while yielding the better result in this case, is overly broad
in its definition of protected speech. If one concedes that the public employee
can never completely divorce himself from his identity when speaking as a
citizen, it follows that a test which ignores his status and, indeed, protects
even speech on matters of purely private concern, unfairly discounts the
notion that his employer, the government, may have legitimate interests in
the effect of the speech on its ability effectively to govern.
Alternative three recognizes the dual status of the speaker as employee
and citizen and allows for consideration of legitimate governmental concerns.
In weighing the interests of the parties, however, this alternative avoids the
trap of unduly focusing on the inquiry of whether the speech may be
abstractly categorized as involving a matter of public concern, and rather
addresses that issue as part of the larger inquiry into the competing rights
of the parties. Because the courts would be required to engage in greater
analysis of the competing interests of the parties, the resulting decisions
would furnish public employees and employers alike with clearer guidance,
thus reducing the prevailing conflict and confusion.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court clearly telegraphed its concern in Connick that public
employees might frustrate legitimate discipline by their employers by litigating
spurious free speech claims. To avoid that possibility, the Court has constructed a test that unfairly burdens the employee by requiring him to
demonstrate that the speech fits neatly into a category of speech on a matter
of public concern. The problem, as evidenced by the lower court decisions
rendered since Connick, is that the courts have not defined with certainty
what speech is protected; indeed, little more emerges from a review of the
decisions than an identification of the variables, often contradictory, which
influence the determination of whether speech is protected. Continued application of the Connick standard will only result in more uncertainty and
supression of speech that should be heard. A better alternative is to return
to the standard set forth in Pickering, so that speech that arguably addresses
a matter of public concern is evaluated in the overall context of the legitimate
interests of the parties.

